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INTRODUCTION
The Defendants claim that there are no disputed facts, but neither their Brief
nor their statement to the trial court that they “believe” there are “disputes of
interpretation of the facts” [JA152] support such a conclusion. Material facts are
in dispute and even the “undisputed facts,” as Defendants claim them to be, allow a
reasonable jury to determine that arguable probable cause to arrest Branch did not
exist. Therefore, the Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on their
assertion of qualified immunity, the trail court’s decision should be reversed and
the case remanded for further proceedings.
Defendants contend that Branch’s need to use the restroom, the time of day,
and Branch’s re-entry into the vehicle are all somehow indicative of intoxication.
They further contend that these specious indicia of intoxication gave them arguable
probable cause to arrest Branch for violating the Minnesota open container law
when they found her husband’s empty flask under the passenger seat of his care
while she was riding with him. However, they do not confront any of Branch’s
arguments establishing that these facts do not lead to a reasonable inference of
intoxication or the necessary probable cause to arrest Branch. Rather than address
the facts and inferences in dispute, and support that analysis with sufficient case
law, Defendants cite the same cases that were used in the trial court without
addressing or refuting the distinctions shown in the Opening Brief.
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By the same token, Defendants ignore the critical evidence weighing against
any determination that a reasonable officer could believe Branch was intoxicated
and in violation of the open container law. In doing so, Defendants attempt to
deviate from established law requiring that probable cause be based on all the
evidence presented and the circumstances as a whole, not simply those facts which
could support arrest under some other circumstance. United States v. Capers, 685
F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1982). Defendants do not address any of the exculpatory
evidence known to officers at the time of arrest, such as the empty water bottles in
the car and the admission by Branch’s husband that the flask was his.
The only significant undisputed fact that Defendants can rely on is Branch’s
general proximity to the flask as a passenger in the flask owner’s vehicle.
However, Defendants have not cited a single case finding constructive possession
based on the mere proximity to an object or any other case with sufficiently
analogous circumstances finding constructive possession. Simply put, the
Defendants have failed to present, and Branch could not find, any case where
summary judgment was granted based on such a weak set of facts, many of which
Defendants admit are open to differing inferences as to whether reasonable officers
would have sufficient probable cause to arrest Branch. Summary judgment was
thus inappropriate, and the case should be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
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ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WHEN THERE ARE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS AND
INFERENCES OVER WHETHER THERE WAS ARGUABLE
CAUSE TO ARREST BRANCH
Whether arguable probable cause existed at the time of arrest is a question

that must be left for the jury when, as here, there is a clear dispute of material fact
concerning whether the facts and circumstances support such probable cause. See
Livers v. Schenk, 700 F.3d 340, 352, 358-62 (2012) (finding that summary
judgment was properly denied because there were questions of fact for the jury to
determine). Before the trial court, Defendants freely admitted that they “believe”
there are “disputes of interpretation of the facts,” [JA152] and, as the Opening
Brief demonstrates, there are also material disputes of the facts themselves.
Defendants mischaracterize Branch’s arguments as requiring an elevated
standard, but Branch readily agrees with Defendants that Defendants must prove
the existence of arguable probable cause to prevail at the summary judgment stage.
See Defendant’s Br. 11. When determining if there is a material issue of fact on
the potential that arguable probable cause exists, a court must engage in an analysis
of “[t]he cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances at the time of arrest,”
not simply the factors that might support Defendants’ decision to arrest Branch.
United States v. Capers, 685 F.2d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1982). As Defendants
correctly state, a “court may not allow a case to go forward to trial on the mere
-3-

chance that a jury will disregard all evidence and accept the unsupported
speculation of a party.” Defendants’ Br. 19, citing Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974
F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 1992). But when, as here, there are material issues of
fact and when further conflicting inferences can be drawn from these facts,
summary judgment must be denied, because “the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Snyder v. U.S., 717 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th
Cir. 1983).
II.

THERE ARE DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACTS AND
INFERENCES REGARDING WHETHER A REASONABLE POLICE
OFFICER WOULD BELIEVE BRANCH WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE
POSSESSION OF THE FLASK
There is no dispute regarding the underlying legal standards. For qualified

immunity to apply, the Defendants must have possessed arguable probable cause
which was based on all the evidence presented and not simply those facts that
might support arrest. Capers, 685 F.2d at 251. Arguable probable cause here
depends on whether a reasonable officer would have believed Branch was in
constructive possession of the flask. Opening Br. 11-12; Defendants’ Br. 6-7. The
parties further agree that constructive possession requires proof that either the item
was under the exclusive control of the individual, or the individual was
demonstrating conscious dominion and control over the item. Minnesota v.
Florine, 226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Minn. 1975); Minnesota v. Porter, 674 N.W.2d
-4-

424, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). Defendants did not meet their burden to show
there was arguable probable cause, based on all the evidence available to them at
the time of arrest, to believe that either Branch possessed exclusive control of the
flask or that Branch was demonstrating conscious dominion and control over flask.
A.

A Reasonable Juror Could Find That No Reasonable Police
Officer Would Believe Branch Exercised Exclusive Control Over
the Flask

While having exclusive control of an item can equate to constructive
possession, Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 611, the circumstances of Branch’s arrest
clearly do not fulfill the definition of exclusive control. As Florine states,
exclusive control is when an item is found in an area “to which other people did
not normally have access.” Id. This is a high burden, as exclusive control is
generally understood to be difficult to meet, and, in most cases, the court simply
assumes that it does not apply. See e.g. Minnesota v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239
(Minn. 2007); Minnesota v. Lee, 683 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2004); Minnesota v.
Robinson, 517 N.W.2d 336 (Minn. 1994); Minnesota v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212
(Minn. 1992).
In Minnesota v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 267 (Minn. 1985), the Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant had constructive possession of
marijuana found in his bedroom in a shared house. The Minnesota Supreme Court
dismissed the exclusive control argument with a single sentence: “[t]he evidence
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shows that other persons had access to the house, and in fact lived there, and that
bedroom ‘2’ was not under appellant’s exclusive control.” Id. at 270. Similarly, in
Minnesota v. Johnson, No. A11–2256, 2012 WL 4476527 at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 2012), the court considered constructive possession of a weapon in an
automobile. There the court determined that Johnson had exclusive control when
he was discovered to be the operator and sole occupant of a vehicle, after leading
police on a chase which ended at his home and after he had sole possession and
control of the vehicle prior to fleeing police. Id. Based on these facts, the court
found exclusive control over the vehicle, and thus exclusive control over the
weapon inside. Id.
Thus, to obtain summary judgment based on exclusive control, the
Defendants must show that it is not possible for a reasonable jury to find that
Defendants acted unreasonably in determining that the space beneath the passenger
seat was a place over which no one, apart from Branch, normally had access.
However, it is clear that a jury could find that Defendants were unreasonable if
they believed that Branch had exclusive control of the space underneath the
passenger seat. It was not her car, she was not the driver, she was not the car’s
only occupant at the time the car was pulled over, and the flask was found in a
location where it is reasonable to believe that she did not even know it was there
(most passengers do not check under the seat when entering a car or riding with
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someone else). Much like the shared house in Wiley, there were other regular
occupants, and here, there was even another occupant at the time of the arrest.
Defendants suggest that after Branch’s husband was removed from the
vehicle and arrested, “the area under her seat was within her exclusive control.”
Defendants’ Br. 14. However, Defendants plainly cannot remove the driver of the
vehicle, arrest him and then immediately turn around and assert that now Branch
has exclusive control. Indeed, at the time Defendants arrested the driver they also
had control over Branch and presumably would have seen if Branch had done
anything furtive under the seat. The car was the possession of Branch’s husband
and he clearly had access to the vehicle including the space under the passenger
seat. Branch, at the time of the arrest, neither had exclusive control of the vehicle
as a whole or the flask located underneath a seat accessible to anyone on the
vehicle and it would be unreasonable for the Defendants to believe otherwise.
B.

A Reasonable Juror Could Find That No Reasonable Police
Officer Would Believe That Branch Had Conscious Control of the
Flask

The Defendants’ Brief does not address Branch’s arguments concerning her
lack of conscious control over the flask. Instead, Defendants appear to simply rely
on Branch’s proximity to her husband’s flask and spend a substantial amount of
time refuting minor issues about the contents and specific location of the flask.
Defendants’ Br. 17. However, conscious dominion and control requires much
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more than mere proximity; it requires knowledge of the illegal substance, ability to
control it, and intent to do so. United States v. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d 628 (8th
Cir. 2004). The standard requires a strong inference that an individual at one time
physically possessed the substance and did not abandon that possessory interest in
the substance but rather continued to exercise dominion and control over it up to
the time of the arrest. Florine, 226 N.W.2d at 610-11. Conscious dominion and
control can be demonstrated in three ways: furtive movements, ability to identify
the illegal object or substance, and when the individual is the sole occupant of the
vehicle. Minnesota v. Munoz, 385 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). None
of these factors are present in this case in this case.
First, Defendants do not claim they observed Branch making any suggestive
or secretive movements in an attempt to conceal the flask. Second, according to
Branch, she was unaware that the flask was in the vehicle. JA135. Since
Defendants claim that the location of the flask is immaterial, and concede that it
was found in the passenger compartment, for the purposes of argument, Branch
will assume the flask was completely under the passenger’s seat out of view.
Defendants’ Br. 4, 11. With the flask located completely under the seat and out of
Branch’s view, Branch disavowing any knowledge that the flask had been there,
and Branch’s husband stating that the flask was his own, [JA135], a reasonable
jury could determine that it was unreasonable for Defendants to believe that
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Branch had constructive possession of the flask. Given these very limited facts,
Defendants could have engaged in more investigation. If they had, they may have
learned that, among other things, Branch had not seen the flask for an entire year
because it came with a gift set her husband received for his birthday. Id. A
reasonable jury could find that, based on the totality of these circumstances,
Defendants did not possess arguable probable cause and are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
Defendants make the attenuated argument that Branch showed sufficient
indicia of intoxication for them to have probable cause to believe that she had
consumed alcohol which in turn gave them probable cause to believe that the
alcohol came from her husband’s flask found in the vehicle which in turn gave
them arguable probable cause to believe she was in violation of the Minnesota
open container law. Defendants have not provided a single case establishing that
an indicia of intoxication provides the probable cause necessary to arrest a
passenger under the open container law. That is not surprising given the fact that,
in cases like this, even if there were indicia of intoxication, it would no more
suggest that the passenger was drinking in the car than it suggests that the
passenger was drinking at the prior location before entering the car.
Moreover, the facts Defendants use to support their theory do not establish,
as a matter of law, that it was reasonable to believe she was intoxicated. Common
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indicia of intoxication include slurred speech, swaying movements, bloodshot
eyes, and an individual who smells strongly of alcohol. See e.g. Musgjerd v.
Commissioner of Public Safety, 384 N.W.2d 571, 574 (Minn. App. 1986); Thomas
v. Drover’s Inn Associates, CIV.02-1682(DWF/SRN), 2003 WL 22738538, at *5
(D. Minn. Nov. 13, 2003). Prior to her arrest, Branch did not exhibit any of these
characteristics which might give rise to arguable probable cause. Instead of
pointing to any of these common factors, Defendants articulate four factors that
allegedly indicate Branch was consuming alcohol: (1) the urgent need to use a
restroom; (2) time of day; (3) her re-entry of the vehicle on the driver’s side; and
(4) some purported argumentative nature. Defendants’ Br. 15. Based on the
evidence taken in the light most favorable to Branch, a jury could find that none of
these factors are sufficient, taken individually or together, to lead a reasonable
officer to believe that Branch was intoxicated.
While an urgent need to urinate is indicative of the consumption of liquids, it
is not suggestive of the consumption of alcohol over any other liquid. Opening Br.
19. There were multiple water bottles in the vehicle and Branch was drinking
water as they drove the vehicle home. JA 131-32. Defendants make no effort to
explain how these facts, known to Defendants at the time of arrest, would not lead
a jury to find that Branch’s need to urinate was not an indication of intoxication.
Moreover, Branch’s multiple requests to urinate, whether twice or twenty times,
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are of no consequence whatsoever because she was never allowed to relieve herself
and the urge, therefore, would not subside. Opening Br. 19. The urge to urinate
does not simply go away like a headache. Defendants do not address any of this in
their brief, but it could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the urge to urinate
was not a reasonable indication of intoxication.
Likewise, the time of day is not indicative of alcohol consumption or
intoxication. Defendants argue that nighttime is a more likely time for an
individual to consume alcohol, but they do not provide any support for this
conclusion. Nor do they account for the contrasting fact that it was a Sunday night,
which is a night on which most people are less likely to drink alcohol than other
nights of the week. Some courts have found that time of day may be a relevant
consideration to conduct further investigation, but only when the time of day is
specifically connected with other, more suggestive factors. See e.g. Minnesota v.
Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. 1988) (stating that there was an “objective
basis for believing that it was necessary to scientifically ascertain defendant’s
blood alcohol level” after the driver fled the scene of an accident, because, among
half a dozen other factors, “it was the time of day that, when an accident such as
this occurs, drinking is often found to be involved”); Columbus v. Anderson, 74
Ohio App. 3d 768, 770 (1991) (stating that an officer had a reasonable suspicion
sufficient to conduct a field sobriety test due to “the moderate odor of alcoholic
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beverage, and the time of day”). The trial court used time of day to justify an
arrest, rather than to justify a field sobriety test. A reasonable jury could resolve
that the failure to undertake a field sobriety test indicates that these weak indicia of
intoxication are more post hoc rationalization than a true basis for Branch’s arrest.
Moreover, the time of day, without significant connection to other activity,
is not sufficient to support an inference of drinking or intoxication. For example,
in United States v. Nicholas, the court found time of day unpersuasive. 104 F.3d
368 (table), 1996 WL 731605 at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1996) (unpublished
opinion). The Tenth Circuit stated that “the connection between the early hour and
the likelihood of Mr. Nicholas’s intoxication is counter-intuitive.” Id. The court
reasoned that time of day would be important if the defendant was falling asleep at
the wheel or engaging in general malfeasance, but early morning hour did not
make drinking a logical step. Id.; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 (1979)
(concluding that nighttime activity per se is not sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity).
Here, Branch was an unassuming passenger, not engaging in any criminal or
otherwise inappropriate activity. While she was traveling in a vehicle with her
husband at night, Branch provided a very reasonable explanation for the time of
day completely unrelated to any indicia of intoxication. Shortly after midnight, she
was returning home from a church event she attended with her husband that
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evening. JA132. There is simply nothing related to the time of day to increase the
likelihood that Branch was intoxicated and certainly the time of day could not give
Defendants arguable probable cause to arrest Branch for a violation of the open
container law based on some assumption that she had been drinking alcohol out of
her husband’s flask.
Branch’s reentry of the vehicle on the driver’s side and purported belligerent
behavior also are no indication of intoxication when viewed in the light most
favorable to Branch. As Branch noted in the Opening Brief [at 20], and
Defendants fail to even address, Officer Garbisch himself testified that Branch’s
purported belligerence was typical of an average person in a police situation. JA
91-92. Officer Garbisch testified that Branch’s uncooperativeness constituted
“questioning what I was doing, if I knew what I was doing, why I was doing it, that
sort of thing,” and said that such questions were very typical of people who were
being detained by the police, because they are generally not happy to be there. JA
90-91. As with the other purported factors indicating intoxication allegedly
sufficient to give rise to arguable probable cause, Branch’s actions indicate nothing
more than any typical person detained by the police. Given that Branch’s reaction
was the typical reaction of someone who is being held by the police, a jury could
find it unreasonable for those same officers to conclude that Branch’s behavior was
indicative of intoxication.
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None of the purported indicia of intoxication that Defendants have rehashed
in their brief indicate Branch was intoxicated at the time of the arrest and they
certainly do not demonstrate arguable probable cause that Branch had constructive
possession of the flask. Simply repeating the trial court’s erroneous recitation is
not enough. Defendants should have addressed the reasoning establishing that
these facts are not indicia of intoxication when taken in the light most favorable to
Branch. But they apparently have no response. That is unsurprising because there
is no response—a reasonable jury could find the officers’ purported belief that
Branch was intoxicated to be unreasonable under the circumstances.
Given the disputes of material facts on Defendants’ only purported
justification for arresting Branch and the disputed inferences drawn from those
facts, summary judgment in Defendants’ favor was improper.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment to the
Defendants-Appellees in this case should be reversed and the case should be
remanded for further proceedings.
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